The Radboud Reader: A Minimal Trusted Smartcard Reader for Securing Online Transactions by Poll, E. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a preprint version which may differ from the publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/111269
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
The Radboud Reader: a minimal trusted
smartcard reader for securing online transactions
Erik Poll and Joeri de Ruiter
Institute for Computing and Information Sciences, Digital Security Group,
Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
Abstract. We present the design of a device for securing online transac-
tions, e.g. for internet banking, which can protect against PC malware,
including Man-in-the-Browser attacks. The device consists of a USB-
connected smartcard reader with a small display and numeric keyboard,
similar to devices currently used for internet banking. However, unlike
existing devices, we rigorously stick to the design philosophy that the
device should be as simple as possible; move functionality and control is
moved as much as possible to the smartcard. Although this is a simple
(and obvious) idea, we are not aware of any solutions pursuing it. More-
over, it has some interesting benefits compared to existing solutions: the
device is simpler, provides stronger security guarantees than many al-
ternatives (namely that it will only display text authenticated by the
smartcard), and is generic in that it can be used in combination with
different smartcards for different applications (for example, for internet
banking with a bank card and for filing an online tax return with a
national ID card).
1 Introduction
A fundamental problem in securing online transactions is the lack of a trustwor-
thy device to communicate with the human end user. The software on laptops
and PCs, but also smart phones, is so large and complex that security vulner-
abilities are inevitable. This means that these devices are not trustworthy as
input or output channel to communicate to the user (via the display, keyboard
or mouse), as malware can manipulate the display and eavesdrop on any input.
Smartcards are a potential improvement in that they provide a secure com-
puting platform. The chances of exploitable security vulnerabilities in the soft-
ware on a smartcard are much lower than for a PC or laptop, given the very
small size and the very limited functionality of the code. However, a serious and
fundamental limitation of smartcards is the lack of a display and keyboard.1
This means that a smartcard requires some terminal with a display for output
and a keyboard for user input, and this terminal has to be trusted.
Given the issues above, the more secure solutions that use smartcards to
secure online transactions rely on a dedicated smartcard reader with a numeric
1 Still, the first smartcards with keyboard and display are in commercial use.
keyboard and display. The most prominent example is the EMV-CAP standard
for internet banking [3, 10]. Some of these devices are connected by USB to
the computer, which can both increase user convenience – as the user does not
have to type over numbers to and from the device – and security, by providing a
‘What You See is What You Sign’ guarantee. Section 5 compares various existing
solutions.
This paper presents an alternative design for a solution, the Radboud Reader,
where we rigorously stick to the design principle that the device should be as
simple as possible. Where possible functionality is moved to the smartcard rather
than the reader and the smart card is given control as much as possible. Although
these principles are rather obvious, and the resulting system is quite a natural
solution, we are not aware of anyone else proposing a system like this. The
resulting system which we present in this paper has some interesting advantages
over existing solutions:
– The device is simpler than alternative solutions: it contains no secrets, and
does not need to support any cryptographic operations or even hashing.
Keeping the device simple also reduces the chance of security vulnerabilities
in the device.
– Our solution gives stronger security guarantees than most other solutions:
the device provides a trusted display which only displays text approved by
the smartcard, so that the smartcard can check say a digital signature on
any text before it is displayed.
– The device is generic and can be used in combination with different smart-
cards for different purposes.
Section 2 describes the high-level design of the system, which is discussed in
more detail in Section 3. Section 4 discusses our prototype, Section 5 compares
our solution with existing devices and Section 6 concludes.
2 Security objectives and high-level design
The basic set-up, shown in Fig. 1, is the same as with any USB-connected smart-
card reader for internet banking: a web browser on a PC communicates with a
remote web server over the internet and with a smartcard reader via a USB
cable. The smartcard reader has its own display and numeric keypad with two
additional buttons marked ‘OK’ and ‘Cancel’, so the user can interact with both
the PC and the reader for input and output, via their respective displays and
keyboards.
The objective is that, unlike the PC, the reader can be a trusted input and
output device, meaning that we rely on
S1 authenticity of whatever is displayed on the display,
S2 confidentiality of anything that is entered on the keyboard,
S3 non-repudiation of any transactions confirmed or declined by pressing ‘OK’
or ‘Cancel’.
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Fig. 1. Set-up
Although a complete transaction might be performed using only the reader, this
is not very user friendly given its limited display and numeric-only keyboard.
Therefore, the PC can still be used to set up the connection to the service
provider and enter the transaction details.
2.1 Attacker model
The attacker is assumed to be in full control of the network and of the PC, in-
cluding the USB connection to the reader, but not of the reader or the smartcard,
and the communication between them. If one abstracts away from the PC then
this is equivalent to assuming a Dolev-Yao attacker [2] on the communication
between the remote server and the reader.
Our main concern is an online attacker, with possibly total control over the
PC, but without physical access to the reader or the smartcard. Attackers with
physical access are only a secondary concern. This means that physical tamper-
resistance or tamper-evidence of the reader is not crucial: they are nice properties
to have, but in practice one will only want to spend a limited amount to realising
them to some degree. Of course, one would want to include protection against
shoulder surfing, e.g. by not echoing say a PIN code on the display as it is entered
on the reader.
2.2 High level design decisions
For the reader to be a trusted input and output device, we will ensure that
– all output on the display comes from the smartcard, and
– all input to the device is only sent to the smartcard,
as illustrated in Fig. 2. This means that the smartcard can ensure authenticity
of the output to the screen, and confidentiality of the input from the keyboard.
By only allowing the smartcard to output to the display, we get a trusted
display, where authenticity of displayed messages can be enforced by the smart-
card. Allowing the PC to display text would allow malware on the PC to control
the display, even though the device could still offer the guarantee of ‘What You
See is What You Sign’.
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Fig. 2. Information flows in the Radboud Reader. NB all I/O the device offers to the
user is with the smartcard, not the PC, and all communication between the user and
remote server has to pass through the smartcard.
So physically the reader is between the smartcard and the PC, but logically
– i.e. considering the information flows – the smartcard is between the PC and
the reader.2
For the input the Radboud Reader provides a numeric keyboard as well as
an ‘OK’ and ‘Cancel’ button. Output can be displayed on its display consisting
of 80 characters (4 x 20).
Note that it is completely up to the smartcard to decide what functionality
it provides, and how the data communicated with the PC, and via the PC with
the remote server, is secured. Different strategies are possible here:
– The smartcard could set up a secure tunnel to the remote server, analogous
to TLS, ensuring integrity and confidentiality of the entire communication
session between smartcard and the remote server. In such a set-up, one could
let the smartcard only communicate with the back-end, and not communi-
cate with the PC at all.
Many smartcards already provide such a secure tunnelling mechanism, called
Secure Messaging in smartcard jargon. The ISO/IEC 7816 standard [9] al-
ready describes it, as do many other smartcard standards, including the
ICAO standard for electronic passports [8], the EMV standard for payment
cards [4], and the Global Platform standard [6].
– Alternatively, one could choose to sign and/or encrypt parts of messages
exchanged between the smartcard and the remote server on a more piece-
meal basis.
The former approach provides simpler and more robust security. An advantage
of the latter approach might be that the browser can see and display some parts
of the communication between smartcard and PC, which in the former approach
would require additional communication between browser and the back-end.
2 One could even consider using physically different contacts on the smartcard for
communication with the display and communication with the PC. Two of the con-
tacts of smartcard are reserved for future use in the ISO/IEC 7816 standard, so this
is possible. However, this would be a more expensive solution requiring non-standard
smartcards.
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To login to a website using the reader in combination with a smartcard,
one could of course let the smartcard generate a credential to login, using some
challenge-response protocol. It is even possible to let the smartcard to supply the
username (or say, in the case of bank account, the bank account number) to the
remote server when logging in over a secure tunnel, in which case malware on the
PC could not even be able to learn this. Paper receipts for credit card transaction
no longer show the complete card number but only the last four digits. Similarly,
when using the Radboud reader in combination with a smartcard to log-on to
some website, there is no reason to show the actual login name on the PC’s
display if leaking this could give useful information to an attacker.
Inserting a smartcard into a smartcard reader that is attached to a (poten-
tially infected) PC is of course dangerous. Malware on the PC could try to access
functionality of the smartcard in unwanted ways, for example by sending PIN
code guesses to the card, with a small chance of guessing it right, and a big
chance of blocking the card with 3 incorrect guesses. This leads to another secu-
rity requirement, namely that access to functionality of the smartcard is strictly
limited, which we will realise by ensuring that
S4 Input from the PC is forwarded to the smartcard in a specific format so that
it cannot address arbitrary functionality on the card.
Effectively, the reader should provide a firewall between the smartcard and the
PC, which only lets minimal functionality through.
That the device uses a USB-connection to a PC to connect to the internet
and the back-end is not essential; any means of connecting the device to the
internet could be used. USB is the obvious choice in that it is widely available,
and indeed existing smartcard readers use it. An alternative to this would be to
connect with the PC via Bluetooth. Another (more expensive) alternative would
be to simply equip the device with GSM and let it by-pass the PC completely,
though that requires additional measures to link a session on the device with a
session on a PC.
2.3 Functional requirements
To achieve the properties discussed previously, the Radboud Reader needs to
provide the following operations:
1. Starting a session, by selecting the desired application on the smartcard; a
smartcard can hold several applications, and one has to be selected at the
start of a session.
2. Forwarding data received from the PC to the smartcard.
3. Carrying out instructions received from the smartcard; these instructions
can tell the reader to
a) display text and wait for the user to press ‘OK’ or ‘Cancel’;
b) display text and wait for user input;
c) forward data from the smartcard back to the PC, and then wait for new
data from the PC.
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Fig. 3. Typical usage scenario
4. Sending user input from the keyboard to the smartcard, following 3a) or 3b).
Using these operations the smartcard can then construct any interaction with
PC and the user that it wants. A typical usage scenario would be that the
card receives digitally signed information over the internet and displays this on
the device (ensuring that only genuine messages are displayed) and sends out
digitally signed responses (to authenticate transactions). Of course, data received
and sent can also be encrypted as well as signed to ensure confidentiality. It is
up to the smartcard to check or put digital signatures and to en- or decrypt.
Fig. 3 illustrates such a scenario, where the data from the PC is forwarded
to the card, who subsequently shows transaction data on the display. If the user
agrees with this information, the card requests the PIN code from the user as
input. If the PIN code is correct, the card generates a signature which is sent to
the reader to be forwarded to the PC.
3 Detailed design
To implement the functional requirements described above, several decisions
have to be taken:
(i) How is the applet selected on the smartcard?
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(ii) How do we forward data to the smartcard, when data is received from the
PC (i.e. inPC in Fig. 2)?
(iii) How is the distinction made between output from the smartcard that is (a)
destined for the display, (b) a request for input from the user, and (c) output
destined for the PC? (I.e. between outUser and outPC in Fig. 2.)
(iv) How is input by the user forwarded to the smartcard (i.e. inUser in Fig. 2)?
And how can the card distinguish between data coming from the keyboard
and from the PC? (I.e. between inPC and inUser.)
These operations have to be realised at the level of the communication be-
tween the smartcard and the reader, as laid down in the ISO/IEC 7816 standard.
At this level, all communication is via data packets called APDUs (Application
Protocol Data Units). An APDU is simply a sequence of bytes in a fixed format.
The smartcard is a slave in the master-slave communication between smartcard
and reader: the reader sends a command to the smartcard, a so-called command
APDU, and the smartcard answers with a response APDU.
The reader will have to present data to the smartcard in such a way that
the smartcard can distinguish between inPC and inUser in Fig. 2. Similarly, the
smartcard will have to provide its response in such a way that the reader can
distinguish between options 3a), 3b) and 3c) listed earlier. Because we want
the smartcard to be in control as much as possible, these responses from the
smartcard will in fact be instructions 3 for the Radboud reader.
Selecting an application on the smartcard The ISO/IEC 7816 standard uses
AIDs (Application IDentifiers) to identify applications on a smartcard. An AID
is simply a sequence of bytes of a fixed length. AIDs for certain applications have
been standardised, and a smartcard can have one application that is selected by
default.
Selecting the desired application could be done in several ways: by fixing a
unique AID that is selected and hard-coding this in the reader, by hard-coding
a list of AIDs that the reader attempts to select, or by letting the reader select
the default applet. Letting the PC choose the applet to select is of course not a
good option, as it could be abused by malware on the PC.
For simplicity, we choose to use a fixed AID to select the application on
the smartcard. We choose an AID here that is not already used for an existing
standard application. As soon as the smartcard is inserted in the reader, the
application is selected.
Forwarding PC communications to the smartcard One security-critical piece of
functionality of the device is to provide a kind of firewall to shield the smartcard
from malicious actions by the PC. One way of doing this would be to block all
traffic except a minimal white-list or a single instruction. Another would be to
prepend data sent to the smartcard with a fixed prefix.
3 To avoid confusion with the standard terminology of commands for messages from
the reader to the smartcard, we will call such messages from the smartcard to the
reader instructions and not commands.
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CLA INS DATA 00 00 Le data0 data1 · · ·
CLA INS USER INPUT 00 00 Le OK / Cancel input0 input1 · · ·
Fig. 4. Data formats for the command APDUs to pass PC data and user input to the
card.
The former approach is a classical method for firewalls. The PC can send
APDUs to the reader, who will forward them to the card only they are allowed
according to its rules. These rules would have to be fixed for all possible appli-
cations, as they are stored in the reader. (One could make this APDU firewall
configurable, with configuration controlled by the smartcard, but this introduces
a lot of complexity.) Therefore it needs to be decided in advance what APDUs
might be necessary and can be allowed to pass through.
We choose the latter approach, where the data received from the PC is
wrapped as payload in an APDU with a dedicated instruction. Using this ap-
proach, the reader does not have to process the data it receives in any way: it
simply forwards communication received from the terminal with a fixed prefix.
We are free to choose the prefix, but we should make sure this prefix does not
have a meaning already in the ISO/IEC 7816 standard. Otherwise the reader
could accidentally trigger functionality in a smartcard that was not designed to
be used with the USB reader.
3.1 Format of data sent to the smartcard
As explained above, the reader will simply forward data from the PC to the
smartcard – i.e. inPC in Fig. 2 – with a fixed prefix. For user input on the device
– inUser– the reader will use a different prefix, so that the card can distinguish
them. Fig. 4 gives the data formats for this, which use the constants INS DATA
and INS USER INPUT as the so-called instruction byte (the second byte of the
command APDUs):
– INS DATA indicates that the APDU contains data forwarded from the PC.
The data that is received from the PC is wrapped in an APDU and forwarded
as it is.
– INS USER INPUT indicates that the APDU contains user input entered on the
keyboard. The first byte of the data indicates whether the ‘OK’ or ‘Cancel’
button was pressed and, in case that ‘OK’ was pressed, the rest of the data
gives the user input.
3.2 Format of data sent by the smartcard
The three instructions that the smartcard can give to the reader use the data
formats presented in Fig. 5, where the first byte specifies the instruction:
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RESP DISPLAY text0 text1 · · ·
RESP REQUEST INPUT echo on/off length input text0 text1 · · ·
RESP DATA data0 data1 · · ·
Fig. 5. Data formats for the response APDUs that provide instructions of the smart-
card to the reader
– RESP DISPLAY instructs the reader to display the text returned by the smart-
card. The text to be displayed should not be longer than 80 characters for
our prototype and is supplied after the RESP DISPLAY instruction. When dis-
playing data following a RESP DISPLAY instruction, the reader waits for the
user to either press ‘OK’ or ‘Cancel’. This input is then sent to the smartcard
using the INS USER INPUT command.
– RESP REQUEST INPUT instructs the reader to request user input. The second
byte indicates whether input should be echoed, i.e. if the user can see the
input on the screen or only masked characters. The third byte indicates the
maximum input length. A string is appended to this that will be shown
before the input. The length of this string together with the maximum input
length cannot be longer than 80 characters for our prototype. After receiving
a RESP REQUEST INPUT instruction, the reader lets the user input data using
the keypad. The reader uses a INS USER INPUT instruction to return the
result to the smartcard.
– RESP DATA instructs the reader to forward the data returned by the smart-
card to the PC and wait for new data from the PC.
After each command sent to the smartcard, the card can respond with
a new instruction, making it possible to perform multiple RESP DISPLAY and
RESP REQUEST INPUT instructions before finally returning data to the PC using
the RESP DATA instruction.
4 Prototype reader
To show the functionality of the Radboud Reader, we constructed a prototype
using the Arduino platform4 (see Fig. 6).5 The code is approximately 350 lines of
code and the components cost around 50 Euro. This prototype can demonstrate
the feasibility of the approach and developing it was a useful exercise to make
sure we resolved all implementation and design choices that have to be made in
realising an implementation. Using this prototype protocols can be developed
and tested.
4 http://www.arduino.cc
5 Available from http://www.cs.ru.nl/ joeri/
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Fig. 6. Prototype based on Arduino platform
We implemented one sample protocol on an actual smartcard. The protocol
provides integrity and confidentiality of communication between the smartcard
and the issuer. For this, the smartcard contains a symmetric key, that is shared
with the issuer, an asymmetric key pair and the public key of the issuer. The
issuer also knows the shared symmetric key, the public key of the smartcard and
its own asymmetric key pair.
The issuer starts the protocol by sending a command to initialise the pro-
tocol. The smartcard responds by sending a nonce and his identity, encrypted
using the public key of the issuer. In response the issuer sends the smartcard’s
nonce together with his own nonce, both encrypted using the public key of the
smartcard, back. The smartcard will then generate a random session key, which
he encrypts using his shared symmetric key. To ensure integrity of the session
key, as it is a random string, a MAC is computed over the encryption.
After the session key is established, so-called Secure Messaging is used to
provide confidentiality and integrity of the communication session between the
smartcard and issuer, as in an SSH or TLS tunnel.
The Session Sequence Counter (SSC), that is used to prevent replay, is ini-
tialised to the concatenation of the nonces of the issuer and the smartcard.
With Secure Messaging, first the data is encrypted using the session key.
Subsequently a MAC is computed over the encrypted data. To prevent replays,
the first block that is processed in the computation of the MAC is the SSC,
whose value is increased by one after each message.
5 Related work – Differences with existing devices
To compare our approach with existing devices, several security features can be
taken into consideration:
1. The device may guarantee ‘What You See is What You Sign’ (i.e. guarantee
that the transaction details shown on the display are in fact what is signed),
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but it may also provide a trusted display that can guarantee that any data
shown on the display is authentic (i.e. originates from the service provider).
2. The device can support cryptographic operations, increasing the complexity
of the device.
3. The device can include secrets, for instance in the form of secret keys (in
case that the device can do cryptographic operations). But it is also possible
that the functionality of the device is (partly) secret, in which case we may
not be able to tell if it contains say a secret key or if it simply contains some
unknown use of a hash function.
4. The device may be unconnected, and not provide any means of communica-
tion between it and the PC, or, in case it does, this communication may be
bidirectional (e.g., in the case of USB), or uni-directional (e.g., in the case
of optic communication from the PC to the device).
5. Finally, there is the question of how generic the device is, i.e. whether the
device can be used for several purposes and users.
For some of these characteristics one can still argue whether they improve or
weaken security. E.g., having secrets in the device makes it harder to produce a
fake version or a software implementation of the devices, but makes generic use
harder.
Table 1 gives a comparison of different devices based on these features. Below
we discuss these devices in more detail.
Manufacturers typically do not publish technical details about the devices
they produce, (though they do sometimes apply for patents, e.g. [7]). This means
that for some devices we do not know all the features, unless the working has
been reverse-engineered. Ideally vendors would provide this kind of information
publicly so the clients can make a better comparison between different devices.
Unconnected smartcard readers with a display and keyboard are widely used
for online banking. Many of these systems use EMV-CAP, a proprietary protocol
of MasterCard, defined on top of the EMV standard [4]. This has advantages,
namely that existing EMV smartcard implementations, which may have under-
gone costly security certifications, can be re-used, but also introduces the risk
of ambiguities in different meanings of the same protocol messages [3]. When
using these devices, the user receives a numeric challenge from the bank on his
PC. This challenge and PIN code have to be entered on the reader, which then
generates a response, using the user’s smartcard, that has to be entered on the
PC again. The challenges are often just random numbers with no meaning to the
human user. They may also include account numbers or amounts, i.e. data more
meaningful to the user, which then could protect against Man-in-the-Browser
attacks at the expense of the user having to enter more input and relying on the
user to know what the meaning of all parts of the challenge is.
EMV-CAP has been largely reverse-engineered [3, 10]. In some variants the
digital signature (or rather, a 3DES MAC) is computed in the device, and not
by the smartcard [10]. Note that not having any cryptographic capabilities in
the device, as we do, makes such a bad choice impossible.
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Some banks already use a USB-connected reader for internet banking. Com-
panies supplying solutions for this include VASCO and Gemalto. As far as we
know, none of these devices provide a trusted display: they display data that
is received over the USB cable in plaintext without any integrity checks. This
means that malware on an infected PC could show anything it wants, and could
even use the display of the reader as part of a sophisticated phishing attack.
Even if these devices do not guarantee that what is shown on the display is
authentic in any way, they can provide ‘What You See is What You Sign’ by
sending the displayed text to the card to be signed.
One variant of a USB-connected reader, produced by Gemalto, has been
reverse-engineered, and found to contain a security flaw [1]. This demonstrates
once again the danger in relying on closed, proprietary solutions. It also provides
further support for our design philosophy of keeping the device as simple as
possible.
The Zone Trusted Information Channel, or ZTIC6 from IBM comes closer
to our approach in the security it provides [11]. The ZTIC is a small USB-
connect smartcard reader with a small display and allows user input by means
of two buttons (for OK and Not OK) and a wheel that can be turned to input
numbers. Unlike the Radboud Reader, the ZTIC has cryptographic capabilities
and the keys and certificates to set up a secure SSL/TLS tunnel between the
ZTIC and a remote web server. Every device has its own certificates for mutual
authentication with the issuer.
One difference between the ZTIC and our proposal is that the ZTIC is a
more complicated device, capable of storing keys and doing crypto. Unlike our
solution, which is generic and can be used in conjunction with any compatible
smartcard, the ZTIC needs to have the certificate for each service provider in
order to communicate with it. Another difference, and possible advantage of the
ZTIC, is that the common functionality to provide a secure tunnel is provided by
the ZTIC, and need not be provided by each smartcard used with the Radboud
Reader: using the ZTIC it is guaranteed to have a secure tunnel, using the
Radboud Reader this still depends on the smartcard.
The FINREAD project proposed a standardised trusted card reader [5]. This
idea never became a success, probably because the FINREAD card reader would
be too expensive and complex; they were meant to be tamper-resistant and
included a PKI support for controlling applications on them.
The AGSES card reader7 does not use a USB connection, but receives data
via a flickering barcode on the PC screen. There is no communication back from
this reader to the PC, so the user has to manually type in the response again.
We do not know if the data sent using the flickering bar code is checked for
authenticity before it is displayed.
6 See http://www.zurich.ibm.com/ztic. Originally, ZTIC stood for Zurich Trusted In-
formation Channel.
7 http://www.agses.net
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Trusted display Crypto Secrets Connected Generic
EMV-CAP reader ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
Gemalto’s ABN-AMRO reader [1] ✗ ✗ ✓a ↔ ✗
ZTIC ✓ ✓ ✓b ↔ ✗
FINREAD ✓ ✓ ✓b ↔ ✓
AGSES ? ✓ ✓b,c → ✗
Radboud Reader ✓ ✗ ✗ ↔ ✓
a Unknown functionality
b Secret key
c Uses fingerprints rather than PIN code
Table 1. Comparison with existing readers
Nowadays, smartcards with integrated keyboard and display are also com-
mercially available. These displays are however very limited, for example, the
smartcard offered by NagraID8 only contains 6 characters.
A solution without even a reader is mTAN. Here the user receives an SMS
on his mobile phone with transaction details and a code to confirm it. Here the
phone could be seen as a trusted display. However, as mobile phones become
more and more complex, they are now becoming popular targets for malware
and attacks just like PCs.
6 Conclusions
The number and importance of online transactions is rapidly growing, and pro-
tecting such transactions in the face of ever more sophisticated malware is a
serious challenge. This is not only an issue in online banking, but also in e-
government services, or indeed any online transactions where one would really
want the online equivalent of a handwritten signature.
We have presented the design of a simple and generic device for securing
online transactions, which protects against any malware on the PC, including
Man-in-the-Browser attacks. The device provides a trusted communication chan-
nel between a user and any remote service provider, by means of a smartcard
issued by that provider.
The essence of our solution, as illustrated in Fig. 2, is quite simple: namely,
make sure that all communication with the user passes through the smartcard.
We are not aware of any solutions that use this approach, even though conceptu-
ally it is quite simple. This solution allows a very simple device, which does not
need any cryptographic capabilities or need not store any keys or other secrets.
Because there are no secrets in the Radboud Reader, e.g. in the form of
secret keys or secret protocols, anyone can make one. This can be considered
a disadvantage (an attacker could make or market fake devices) but also an
advantage, as anyone can implement their own device. Note that there is little
incentive for manufacturers of smartcard readers to come up with solution like
8 http://www.nagraid.com
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ours, where there is no intellectual property or secret in the device, thus allowing
anyone to manufacture it and not having any risk of vendor lock-in.
As discussed in detail in Section 5, the Radboud Reader offers stronger se-
curity than many existing USB-connected smartcard readers with display and
keyboard used for internet banking, except IBM’s ZTIC, as these solutions do
not offer provide a trusted display, i.e. they can not guarantee that what appears
on the display is an authentic message from the remote server.
Unlike other solutions, our solution is completely generic. The functionality
hardcoded in the reader only provides some basic building blocks and the smart-
card is in charge of using these to build the scenario that some service requires.
So the same device can be used by different smartcards for different purposes.
As the number of online services that require a high-security solution to secure
transactions increases, investing in a single reader that can be used for all of
them may prove a practical and economical solution. It may then also become
an option to go for a slightly more expensive device, with a larger display; one
could even imagine an e-reader for digitally signing electronic documents that
operates in the same way as the Radboud Reader, though the limited bandwidth
of communication with the smartcard could then become a bottleneck.
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